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Federal courts have virtually closed their doors to foreign
plaintiffs pursuing personal injury and products liability claims
against U.S. corporations based on injuries incurred abroad.1
Those courts have done so by expansively interpreting the federal
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, which permits a
court to dismiss a case on the ground that it may be tried more
conveniently elsewhere.2 Meanwhile, pro-plaintiff tort laws, discov-
ery rules, choice of law rules, contingent fee arrangements, and
jury awards continue to attract foreign plaintiffs to U.S. forums.3
Thus, foreign plaintiffs increasingly sue in state courts, where the
degree of adherence to the federal forum non conveniens standard
varies among states.5
t A.B. 1986, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Chicago.
I See, for example, In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F
Supp 842 (S D NY 1986), aff'd in part, 809 F2d 195 (2d Cir 1987); and Sibaja v Dow Chemi-
cal Co., 757 F2d 1215 (11th Cir 1985).
3 See Sheila L. Birnbaum and Douglas W. Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non
Conveniens, 16 Brooklyn J Intl L 241 (1990).
s See Russell J. Weintraub, A Proposed Choice-of-Law Standard for International
Products Liability Disputes, 16 Brooklyn J Intl L 225, 225-26 (1990); Note, Foreign Plain-
tiffs and Forum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond Reyno, 64 Tex L Rev 193 (1985). See also
PipeC Aircraft Co. v Reyno, 454 US 235, 252 n 18 (1981).
David W. Robertson and Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational
Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 Tex L Rev
937, 940 (1990).
5 See Section UE.
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In one recent international6 tort case, Dow Chemical Co. v Al-
faro,7 the Texas Supreme Court did not simply diverge from the
federal forum non conveniens standard; that court declared that
the doctrine does not exist in Texas for wrongful death or personal
injury suits.8 As a result of Dow, foreign plaintiffs now have unim-
peded access to Texas courts to vindicate wrongful death and per-
sonal injury claims against corporations doing business in Texas, as
long as their cases meet jurisdictional requirements.
Dow's result kindled controversy even among the justices of
the Texas court, who filed seven separate opinions.9 The decision
raises two questions regarding the use of forum non conveniens in
international litigation in U. S. courts. First, should states be per-
mitted to control foreign plaintiff access to their courts by depart-
ing from (or even abolishing) the federal forum non conveniens
standard? This question raises a "reverse-Erie" inquiry, 0 that is,
whether the federal government's interest in the results of forum
non conveniens decisions in international tort cases is so strong
that federal courts should articulate a federal common law of fo-
rum non conveniens that binds both state and federal courts."' If
the reverse-Erie inquiry does not preclude states from developing
their own forum non conveniens rules, then a second question
must be addressed: Should federal courts sitting in diversity apply
6 In this Comment, the term "international case" denotes a case in which, for forum
non conveniens purposes, the alternate forum lies in a foreign country. Moreover, this Com-
ment deals only with cases involving foreign plaintiffs injured abroad.
786 SW2d 674 (Tex 1990), cert denied, 111 S Ct 671 (1991).
8 The court based its decision on its interpretation of § 71.031 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code, which controls actions for damages for wrongful death or personal
injury. The court construed the statute, originally enacted in 1913, to mean that the state
legislature gave foreign plaintiffs an absolute right to maintain personal injury and wrongful
death actions in Texas. Dow, 786 SW2d at 679. Thus, according to the court, the legislature
abolished forum non conveniens for suits brought under § 71.031. Id. For an explanation of
Texas forum non conveniens law and of the application of § 71.031 before Dow, see Note, A
Foreign Plaintiff Has an Absolute Right to Maintain a Personal Injury Cause of Action in
Texas Without Being Subject to Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal: Alfaro v. Dow Chemi-
cal Co., 20 Tex Tech L Rev 995, 1005-15 (1989).
* Four justices dissented and two wrote concurring opinions.
10 Referring to Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938). Under the reverse-
Erie principle, federal common law preempts state law, even in state courts, in those areas
in which federal courts have authority to develop common law rules. The principle aims to
reduce forum shopping between state and federal courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v
Sabbatino, 376 US 398, 423-27 (1964); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v Tallentire, 477 US 207, 223
(1986); see also Gary B. Born and David Westin, International Civil Litigation in the
United States Courts 186-87 (Kluwer, 1989).
11 See Mark D. Greenberg, The Appropriate Source of Law for Forum Non Conveniens
Decisions in International-Cases: A Proposal for the Development of Federal Common
Law, 4 Intl Tax & Bus Law 155 (1986).
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state or federal forum non conveniens rules? This issue, which the
United States Supreme Court has explicitly left open, 12 is impor-
tant because if diversity courts apply federal forum non conveniens
law, a litigant could circumvent a state's version of the doctrine by
removing to federal court.
While over thirty states, as a matter of state law, apply a fo-
rum non conveniens standard that closely tracks the standard fed-
eral courts apply, some states have yet to resolve the doctrine's
availability and scope in their courts. Texas has placed itself at one
extreme by rejecting the doctrine outright.13 Any state decision to
establish a forum non conveniens rule that is either more strict or
more liberal than the federal rule would implicate the questions
discussed here.
This Comment addresses the two interrelated questions that
Dow presents. Section I describes the history and operation of the
forum non conveniens doctrine. Section II discusses some state fo-
rum non conveniens rules that diverge from the federal doctrine,
including the Texas rule explicated in Dow, and the policies that
support those rules. Section III examines the argument for a fed-
eral common law rule of forum non conveniens for international
cases. That section concludes that states should be able to develop
their own forum non conveniens rules to control foreign plaintiff
access to their courts in international tort cases, even if such rules
radically depart from the federal standard. Finally, Section IV ar-
gues that Erie and choice of law principles indicate that federal
courts should apply state forum non conveniens law in diversity
cases involving international tort claims.
I. FEDERAL FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOcTRINE
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a
court in its discretion to dismiss a case within its jurisdiction on
12 Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 509 (1947) (Court said it did not have to decide
the Erie question because New York and federal forum non conveniens law were the same
for purposes of that case); Williams v Green Bay and W.R. Co., 326 US 549, 558-59 (1946)
(Court reserved decision on whether Erie requires a federal court in a diversity case to apply
the local rule of forum non conveniens); Piper, 454 US at 248 n 13 (Court left unresolved
the question whether state or federal law of forum non conveniens applies in a diversity
case); Chick Karn Choo v Exxon Corp., 486 US 140, 149-50 (1988) (Court did not reach and
expressed no opinion on question whether under the reverse-Erie principle of federal mari-
time law federal forum non conveniens analysis preempts a state law forum non conveniens
determination that differs significantly from the federal standard).
IS For surveys of state forum non conveniens rules, see Robertson and Speck, 68 Tex L
Rev at 950-52 (cited in note 4); Greenberg, 4 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 163-67 (cited in note
11); Born and Westin, International Civil Litigation at 227 (cited in note 10).
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the ground that the case can be tried more conveniently in another
forum.14 Federal courts today apply the doctrine exclusively in the
context of international litigation. 15
In Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert,6 the Supreme Court established a
two-step procedure for deciding whether to dismiss a case on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds. Under this approach, a federal court
must first determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists.
If it does, the court must then decide in which forum the litigation
would best serve the private interests of the litigants and the pub-
lic interests of the forums. 7 Gilbert directs courts to consider such
private interest factors as: ease of access to sources of proof and
witnesses; availability of compulsory process; possibility of view of
premises; enforceability of a judgment; and "all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpen-
sive." 8 Gilbert also directs courts to consider such public interests
as: administrative ease; reasonableness of imposing jury duty on
citizens of a forum that has no relation to the litigation; propriety
of having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is accustomed
to applying the relevant state law; and "a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home."' 9 The Gilbert Court de-
"' Numerous commentators have exhaustively treated the history and application of
forum non conveniens doctrine. See, for example, Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U Pa L Rev 781 (1985); Edward L.
Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cal L Rev 380 (1947); Paxton
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum L Rev 1
(1929); Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv L Rev 908 (1947);
Comment, Considerations of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 74
Cal L Rev 565, 567-75 (1986); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the
Federal Courts, 69 Georgetown L J 1257, 1259-64 (1981). See also citations in Born and
Westin, International Civil Litigation at 208 n 49 (cited in note 10). And see Margaret G.
Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 Cal L Rev 1259 (1986).
1 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F2d 1147, 1159 n 15 (5th Cir
1987) (en banc) ("Only when the more convenient forum is a foreign country can a suit
brought in a proper federal venue be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens."). The
only domestic applications of forum non conveniens today are in state courts (for example,
dismissals in favor of other state forums or other jurisdictions within the state).
For federal domestic cases, Congress in 1948 replaced forum non conveniens with 28
USC § 1404(a), which permits a federal court to transfer a case to another federal court
upon concluding the case should be tried elsewhere in the United States. 28 USC § 1404(a)
(1988) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought." See Piper, 454 US at 253. See also Norwood v Kirkpatrick, 349 US 29,
32 (1955).
16 330 US 501 (1947). See also Koster v (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
330 US 518 (1947) (companion case to Gilbert).
17 Gilbert, 330 US at 506-09. See also Piper, 454 US at 242-44, 254-55 n 22.
Gilbert, 330 US at 508.
19 Id at 508-09.
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clared that unless the balance of factors strongly favors the de-
fendant, a court rarely should disturb the plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum.2 0 Gilbert and its progeny leave the forum non conveniens
determination to the discretion of the trial judge, whose determi-
nation is reviewable only under a deferential "clear abuse of dis-
cretion" standard.2'
In Piper Aircraft Co. v Reyno,22 the Court adapted the forum
non conveniens doctrine to cases of foreign plaintiffs suing in U.S.
courts.23 The Piper Court resolved two important issues. First, the
Court held that the possibility that dismissal would change the
substantive law to be applied should ordinarily not be given con-
clusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens
analysis.2' The Court reasoned that if courts overemphasized the
possibility of an unfavorable change in law, dismissal might be
barred even if the chosen forum were plainly inconvenient, thereby
rendering the forum non conveniens doctrine "virtually useless. '2 5
Second, the Court held that a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum
deserves less deference than a domestic plaintiff's choice of a do-
mestic forum.26
II. STATE FORUM NON CONVENIENS RULES
A few states have established forum non conveniens standards
that significantly deviate from the federal standard. Courts in
Texas and Louisiana have held that the doctrine does not exist in
those states' laws, at least one California court has opted not to
follow Piper, and Florida has permitted forum non conveniens dis-
missals only in limited factual circumstances. In these states, ap-
plying state rather than federal forum non conveniens rules could
mean the difference between adjudication in a U.S. court or dis-
missal in favor of a foreign forum. In Dow, for example, federal
courts sitting in two other states had already dismissed substan-
$0 Id at 508.
21 Piper, 454 US at 257. For criticism of the "clear abuse of discretion" standard in
Piper, see Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L J 747, 748-54
(1982).
22 454 US 235 (1981).
33 This Comment does not discuss Gilbert and Piper in great depth, as other commen-
tators have thoroughly analyzed these cases. For an important example of how federal
courts apply forum non conveniens doctrine under Gilbert and Piper, see In re Union Car-
bide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F Supp at 842.
"' Piper, 454 US at 247.
25 Id at 250.
24 Id at 255-56.
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tially the same suit on forum non conveniens grounds before Texas
state courts heard and decided the case. 7 The difference in out-
come is crucial because few international cases dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds are ever actually tried abroad.28
Many of the points that the Texas Supreme Court justices ar-
gue in Dow highlight the broader policy issues underlying state de-
cisions to establish forum non conveniens rules of a narrow or
broad scope or to reject forum non conveniens altogether. These
policy concerns also lie behind the choice federal courts have made
to develop a forum non conveniens standard less open to interna-
tional tort cases. In Dow, eighty-two Costa Rican banana planta-
tion workers and their wives sued Dow Chemical Company and
Shell Oil Company, Delaware corporations that do business in
Texas.29 The workers, employees of Standard Fruit Company,
claimed to have suffered serious personal injuries, including steril-
ity, as a result of exposure to dibromochloropropane ("DBCP"), a
pesticide that Dow and Shell manufactured. 0 Dow and Shell alleg-
edly shipped several hundred thousand gallons of DBCP to Stan-
dard Fruit in Costa Rica, both before and after the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency banned DBCP's use in the United
States. s"
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of forum non
conveniens.3 The intermediate court reversed the trial court's dis-
"' Many of the same plaintiffs who sued in Dow had originally filed suit in 1983 in the
Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida. The court subsequently removed that case to the
Southern District of Florida, which dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Sibaja, 757 F2d at 1215. Another group sued in
Superior Court for Los Angeles County, California, in 1985. The court removed that case to
the Central District of California, which dismissed it on the basis of forum non conveniens
in 1986. Aquilar v Dow Chemical Co., No 86-4753 JGD (C D Cal 1986). Another group of
these plaintiffs again attempted to sue in a Florida state court, but once again, the defend-
ants successfully removed the case to the Southern District of Florida, which dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds. Barrantes Cabalceta v Standard Fruit Co., 667 F Supp 833
(S D Fla 1987), aff'd in part, and rev'd and remanded in part on other grounds, 883 F2d
1553 (11th Cir 1989). The plaintiffs also brought suit in Harris County, Texas, in 1984. After
the defendants, Dow and Shell, unsuccessfully attempted to remove that suit to federal
court, the state trial court dismissed the case on the ground of forum non conveniens. But
ultimately the Texas Supreme Court reversed in 1990, holding that forum non conveniens
did not exist in Texas. Dow, 786 SW2d at 679.
2S See note 102.
11 Dow, 786 SW2d at 675.
-1 Id. The plaintiffs based their suit against Dow and Shell on theories of product liabil-
ity, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Id at 681 (Doggett concurring).
31 Id.
32 Id at 675.
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missal and the Texas high court affirmed.3 3 The majority of the
Texas Supreme Court decided that the statutory right to advance
a personal injury or wrongful death claim in Texas courts pre-
cluded dismissal through forum non conveniens5 4 Interpreting the
relevant Texas statute, the court determined that the state legisla-
ture had abolished the doctrine.s5
Justice Doggett, in a concurring opinion, contended that the
real issue at stake was whether to hold multinational corporations
responsible at home for their conduct abroad. Doggett stated that
Texas's abolition of forum non conveniens furthered "important
public policy considerations by providing a check on the conduct
of multinational corporations." 6 Doggett asserted that "what is re-
ally involved is not convenience but connivance to avoid corporate
accountability. '37 Doggett counseled against having too much con-
cern for the welfare of multinational corporations and derided the
dissenters' "xenophobic suggestion that foreigners will take over
our courts."36
Justice Hecht, in dissent, chided Doggett for failing to explain
why the U.S. justice system should punish domestic corporations
more severely for their actions in a foreign country than that coun-
try does. 9 Justice Gonzalez, another Dow dissenter, argued that
permitting citizens of other countries to seek redress here for inju-
ries suffered abroad would further clog the already overburdened
judicial system.40
Other states have trod a similar road. In Holmes v Syntex
Laboratories, Inc.,41 a California court held that the state's forum
non conveniens law differed from federal law in three key respects.
First, California accorded much greater deference to a foreign
plaintiff's choice of forum, and second, California attached more
33 Id.
Id at 675-79.
35 Id at 679. For the Dow court's statutory analysis, see note 8.
11 Dow, 786 SW2d at 688 (Doggett concurring). But see In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster, 634 F Supp at 865 (court was "well aware of the moral danger of creating [a]
'double-standard'," but recognized that the Indian interest in protecting its citizens "is sig-
nificantly stronger than the local interest in deterring multinationals from exporting alleg-
edly dangerous technology").
'7 Dow, 786 SW2d at 680 (Doggett concurring). See id at 690 (Gonzalez dissenting); id
at 707 (Hecht dissenting).
Id at 680, 686 (Doggett concurring).
11 Id at 707 n 11 (Hecht dissenting).
40 Id at 690 (Gonzalez dissenting); see also id at 707 (Hecht dissenting).
" 156 Cal App 3d 372 (1984). Another California court disagreed with Holmes and fol-
lowed Piper in Stangvik v Shiley, Inc., 273 Cal Rptr 179 (1990), but the California Supreme
Court has granted review in that case, 275 Cal Rptr 380, 800 P2d 858 (1990).
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weight to the possibility that a forum non conveniens dismissal
would result in application of a law less favorable to the plaintiff.42
Finally, dismissal in California required finding a "suitable" rather
than merely an "adequate" alternative forum. In California, the
Holmes court held, the plaintiff's forum choice and the suitable
forum requirement trump other Gilbert-style private and public
interest factors.43 Thus, the Holmes court reversed a forum non
conveniens dismissal that was based on the federal standard em-
bodied in Piper.44
Some Louisiana courts have held that their state, like Texas,
does not recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine.45 Moreover,
the Fifth Circuit has concluded that applying federal versus Loui-
siana forum non conveniens rules to international cases would
yield vastly different outcomes: "[o]ne case will proceed to judg-
ment and the other will be dismissed to a foreign land. '46
Florida's forum non conveniens rules also sometimes produce
distinctly different outcomes than does the federal doctrine. A
Florida court may not dismiss a suit on forum non conveniens
grounds unless both the plaintiff and defendant are nonresidents
and the cause of action arose outside of Florida.47 In Houston v
Caldwell, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the state "has a
fundamental interest in resolving controversies involving its citi-
zens," and thus established a forum non conveniens rule that cur-
tailed dismissals.48
"I Holmes, 156 Cal App 3d at 380-82.
43 Id at 378-79.
44 Id at 377.
45 See, for example, Kassapas v Arkon Shipping Agency, Inc., 485 S2d 565 (La App
1986) (forum non conveniens doctrine does not exist in Louisiana law). See also Fox v Board
of Supervisors of Lousiana State Univ. and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 576 S2d
978, 986-91 (La 1991).
"6 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F2d at 1157. The court acknowl-
edged the substantive nature of forum non conveniens, but nonetheless decided to apply
federal forum non conveniens law in order to serve the federal interest in self-management
and administrative independence.
" Houston v Caldwell, 359 S2d 858, 861 (Fla 1978). See also Seaboard C. L. R. Co. v
Swain, 362 S2d 17 (Fla 1978); Waite v Summit Leasing & Capital Intl Corp., 441 S2d 185
(Fla App 1983); Oboussier-Lowe v Kuehne & Nagel (A.G. & Co.), 531 S2d 249 (Fla App
1988).
4' Houston, 359 S2d at 861. Other states with forum non conveniens standards that are
narrower than the federal rule include Connecticut and Georgia. See, for example, Picketts
v Intl Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn 490, 576 A2d 518 (1990) (court employed more exacting re-
view of forum non conveniens dismissal than that which federal courts employ, but did not
explicitly diverge from federal authorities); Smith v Board of Regents of the Univ. System
of Georgia, 165 Ga App 565, 302 SE2d 124, 126 (1983) (forum non conveniens doctrine "has
never been expressly sanctioned in Georgia courts").
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III. STATE CONTROL OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN STATE
COURTS
Traditionally, states have been free to develop their own fo-
rum non conveniens law, but state courts generally have applied
such laws only in domestic cases. Because of the potential expan-
sion of international litigation in state courts, however, decisions
such as the Texas legislature's (as interpreted in Dow) raise the
question whether states should be able to deviate from the federal
forum non conveniens doctrine. This Section argues that states
should be allowed to establish their own forum non conveniens
rules or to reject forum non conveniens doctrine outright. Such an
option permits states to regulate the conduct of companies operat-
ing under their laws or within their borders and to decide whether
to adjudicate claims based on state law.
This Comment rejects the argument, set forth by a few com-
mentators, that federal forum non conveniens law should preempt
state law in international cases. These commentators contend that
the decision to dismiss such cases on forum non conveniens
grounds often will affect U.S. foreign relations, a federal govern-
ment concern.49 Thus, according to this argument, the federal
courts may develop a federal common law rule of forum non con-
veniens that, under the reverse-Erie principle, would bind state as
well as federal courts.5 0 But because a state's interest in formulat-
ing its own forum non conveniens rules outweighs the compara-
tively slight federal interest in international tort cases involving
private litigants, a preemptive federal rule is not warranted.5
A. State Interests in Applying State Forum Non Conveniens Law
Strong state interests in controlling the activities of companies
incorporated and operating under state laws militate against bind-
ing state courts to a federal common law of forum non conveniens.
" See Greenberg, 4 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 180-97 (cited in note 11). See also Born and
Westin, International Civil Litigation at 227-28 (cited in note 10).
" See note 10.
61 Arguably, the act of state doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
USC §§ 1602-1611 (1988), which apply in cases involving foreign sovereign entities as par-
ties, prevent any real intrusion into the federal foreign affairs domain. Both are designed to
apply where foreign governments, agencies, or instrumentalities are involved, and therefore
where foreign government interests are explicitly implicated. Foreign relations concerns are
likely to arise in cases involving official foreign parties, in contrast to cases such as those
considered in this Comment, which involve only private foreign litigants and no official acts
or conduct. Regarding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see Born and Westin, Inter-
national Civil Litigation at 335-402 (cited in note 10).
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States should be able to determine the extent to which they will
hold corporations liable for conduct abroad. The fact that interna-
tional tort claims are based on state law and adjudicated under
state choice of law rules bolsters the argument that states should
be able to determine how readily foreign plaintiffs may advance
such claims in their courts. Congress, moreover, has left state law
in control of international tort actions by failing to enact a federal
standard of tort liability for U.S. corporations operating abroad.
Forum non conveniens analysis generally calls upon courts to
weigh the governmental interests of competing forums in the con-
troversy being litigated. States should be free to determine their
own interests in disputes involving state law claims. Furthermore,
states should be free to assert an interest in opening wide their
courthouse doors to foreigners, as Texas did in Dow. Texas Su-
preme Court Justice Doggett, concurring in Dow, noted his concern
that Texans, by sitting on juries, be afforded "the opportunity to
evaluate the conduct of a Texas corporation concerning decisions it
made in Texas," even though the only parties allegedly hurt were
foreigners. 52
States may wish to hold U.S.-based firms liable for their activ-
ities in foreign countries in order to deter misconduct at home as
well as abroad. Justice Doggett noted one form of misconduct spil-
lover when he argued in Dow that the forum non conveniens doc-
trine embodies a "parochial perspective" that
ignores the reality that actions of our corporations affecting
those abroad will also affect Texans. Although DBCP [the
pesticide involved in Dow] is banned from use within the
United States, it and other similarly banned chemicals have
been consumed by Texans eating foods imported from Costa
Rica and elsewhere. 3
States may also wish to avoid holding corporations to a double
standard of liability-one that applies to corporate actions at
home, and another governing actions abroad. 4 Justice Doggett's
" Dow, 786 SW2d at 680 (Doggett concurring).
53 Id at 689 (Doggett concurring).
" See note 36. Some federal courts have acknowledged the potential for a double stan-
dard, but have concluded that foreign forums have a more compelling interest in applying
their own regulations to corporations operating within their borders. See, for example, De
Melo v Lederle Laboratories, 801 F2d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir 1986). The federal district court
in Harrison v Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F Supp 1, 4 (E D Pa 1980), aff'd without opinion,
676 F2d 685 (3d Cir 1982), justified its forum non conveniens dismissal on grounds that it
should not impose the warning and safety requirements for drugs sold in the U.S. upon a
foreign country.
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opinion in Dow was partially based on this desire to hold U.S.-
based multinational corporations accountable at home for their ac-
tivities abroad. Doggett posited that the forum non conveniens
doctrine "enables corporations to evade legal control merely be-
cause they are transnational." 55 Doggett added that the U.S. does
not achieve comity by allowing its multinational corporations to
follow a double standard. 6 Judge Swygert, dissenting from an
Eighth Circuit opinion holding that Brazil had a paramount inter-
est in regulating the quality of drugs in that country through its
own product liability laws, raised a similar point: "I cannot help
observing that [the defendant] is a multinational corporation. It
has chosen to do business in Brazil. When such companies do busi-
ness in foreign countries they should not, by that fact, manage to
evade the force of American law."'57
In such cases, courts must balance the foreign forum's interest
in establishing and enforcing its own safety rules against a U.S.
interest in regulating the activities of U.S.-based corporations
abroad. Due to the absence of federal regulation in this area, the
U.S. interest in this balance belongs to the states under whose laws
corporations operate. States thus should be free to resolve inde-
pendently the double standard dilemma.
Finally, states have an interest in developing their own forum
non conveniens laws in order to control their courts' dockets.5 The
issue of docket congestion figures prominently in the debate over
forum non conveniens. Justice Gonzalez's dissent in Dow highlights
the arguments for blocking the doors of U.S. courts to citizens of
other countries seeking compensation for injuries suffered abroad:
[I]f the legislature fails to reinstate [the forum non con-
veniens] doctrine, Texas will become an irresistible forum for
all mass disaster lawsuits .... "Bhopal"-type litigation, with
little or no connection to Texas will add to our already
crowded dockets, forcing our residents to wait in the corridors
of our courthouses while foreign causes of action are tried.59
Dow, 786 SW2d at 689 (Doggett concurring).
Id at 687 (Doggett concurring).
'7 De Melo, 801 F2d at 1065 (Swygert, sitting by designation, dissenting). The Brazilian
plaintiff in De Melo filed suit in Minnesota, claiming that she was blinded by use of the
drug Myambutol. The drug was manufactured, marketed, and distributed in Brazil by a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Lederle's parent corporation.
"See Robertson and Speck, 68 Tex L Rev at 972 (cited in note 4).
Dow, 786 SW2d at 690 (Gonzalez dissenting).
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Federal courts frequently raise docket congestion concerns to jus-
tify dismissing a foreign plaintiff's suit on the ground of forum non
conveniens6
States are fully competent to formulate their own solutions to
the complex policy problem of weighing court access against
docket congestion.6 1 The Dow court resolved this problem when it
concluded that the state legislature had opted to accord extraordi-
nary access to foreign plaintiffs in wrongful death and personal in-
jury suits against Texas corporations.2
B. Federal Common Law of Forum Non Conveniens
Despite Erie's rejection of the notion of "federal general com-
mon law,"63 the Supreme Court has held that a federal common
law does exist in a few areas involving "uniquely federal inter-
ests."64 Foreign relations is one area which the Court has declared
an "intrinsically federal" concern, on the basis of both constitu-
tional and federal statutory provisions.6 " Some argue that forum
non conveniens determinations (that is, decisions whether to adju-
dicate particular international suits in U.S. courts) implicate for-
eign relations and foreign commerce concerns, and therefore fed-
eral interests.
Courts have articulated federal common law rules for cases in-
volving the act of state doctrine and forum selection clauses, two
areas of law especially relevant to international litigation. Compar-
ing the federal interests at stake in these two areas with those in-
60 See, for example, Sibaja, 757 F2d at 1218, and Piper, 454 US at 252.
01 The Supreme Court held in Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v Mayfield, 340 US 1
(1950), that in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act state courts may deter-
mine the availability of forum non conveniens according to their own law. The Court based
its decision in part on states' interests in controlling their own dockets. Notably, the Court
did not require states to apply federal forum non conveniens law in Mayfield even though
the case involved a federal cause of action, and thus implicated a clear, statutorily-based
federal interest.
02 This conclusion does not undermine the argument in Section IV of this Comment
that federal courts should apply state forum non conveniens law in diversity actions. Fed-
eral administrative concerns do not outweigh the substantive state interests underlying fo-
rum non conveniens. Under Erie, federal courts must apply substantive state law. See In re
Air Crash Near New Orleans, 821 F2d at 1180-86 (Higginbotham concurring).
02 Erie, 304 US at 78.
Boyle v United Technologies Corp., 487 US 500, 504 (1988). See also Henry J.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 NYU L Rev 383
(1964); Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 387-97 (West, 4th ed 1983).
60 Sabbatino, 376 US at 427. See also United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 US 304, 318 (1936); United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937); Zschernig v
Miller, 389 US 429, 432 (1968).
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volved in forum non conveniens reveals that forum non conveniens
decisions do not implicate significant federal concerns.
1. Act of state doctrine.
The act of state doctrine is a common law principle that di-
rects U.S. courts to accept the validity of public acts of foreign
sovereigns within the sovereign's own territory. In Banco Nacional
de Cuba v Sabbatino, the doctrine's leading modern statement, the
Court held that the Cuban government was entitled (against the
claims of former owners) to proceeds from the sale of sugar that
the government had expropriated. 6 The Court applied the act of
state doctrine to the Cuban government's expropriation decree.6 7
The Court also held that, because of the "intrinsically federal" in-
terest in foreign relations, the scope of the doctrine must be deter-
mined according to federal law."'
The Sabbatino Court noted that because the act of state doc-
trine concerns the federal government's relations with other na-
tions, the rule should "not be left to divergent and perhaps paro-
chial state interpretations," and thus the Erie doctrine does not
apply.69 The Court stated that "since the concept of territorial sov-
ereignty is so deep seated, any state may resent the refusal of the
courts of another sovereign to accord validity to acts within its ter-
ritorial borders. '70 The Court went on to assert that piecemeal ju-
dicial decisions that risked offending another sovereign could ham-
per executive branch negotiations related to the adjudicated
matter and would probably affect relations with third countries re-
garding similar matters.1 A uniform, federally-dictated rule was
also necessary, the Court said, to ensure predictability and thereby
maintain the flow of international trade.72
66 Sabbatino, 376 US at 439. For the classic statement of the act of state doctrine, see
Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897). Commentators have discussed Sabbatino
extensively; see, for example, Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal
Courts: Sabbatino, 64 Colum L Rev 805 (1964). See also Richard A. Falk, The Role of Do-
mestic Courts in the International Legal Order (Syracuse, 1964); Michael J. Bazyler, Abol-
ishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U Pa L Rev 325 (1986).
Sabbatino, 376 US at 429-37.
" Id at 421-27. The Court indicated that state courts are required to apply an act of
state doctrine at least as deferential as federal doctrine. Id at 425 n 23. The Court recently
clarified the scope of the act of state doctrine in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., Intl, 493 US 400 (1990).
69 Sabbatino, 376 US at 425, citing Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v
Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 Am J Intl L 740 (1939).
70 Id at 432.
71 Id.
71 Id at 432-34. Referring to the specific circumstances of the Sabbatino case, the Court
noted that if "the attitude of the United States courts were unclear, one buying expropri-
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Compared to cases involving the act of state doctrine, forum
non conveniens decisions do not raise foreign relations concerns to
the same extent. While act of state cases involve the public con-
duct of foreign sovereigns, forum non conveniens decisions in in-
ternational tort cases only concern the conduct of private U.S. cor-
porations. Furthermore, forum non conveniens decisions do not
impinge on territorial sovereignty because such decisions do not
preclude foreign decisionmaking regarding the same underlying
matters. Finally, forum non conveniens determinations in private
international tort cases have only an attenuated impact on interna-
tional trade and thus do not present the same urgent need for pre-
dictability and uniformity as do cases such as Sabbatino7
2. Forum selection clause enforcement.
The federal government's constitutional interest in foreign
commerce74 supports the argument that federal common law must
govern the enforcement of forum selection clauses in international
commercial contracts.7" The need for certainty in international
commercial transactions presses for a federal rule enforcing forum
selection clauses. No comparable need exists, however, for predict-
ability and uniformity of forum non conveniens decisionmaking in
the tort context.
In The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Supreme Court
held that forum selection clauses in international commercial con-
tracts are valid and enforceable unless unreasonable, unfair, or un-
just.76 Most lower federal courts have determined that the Zapata
rule applies in diversity suits involving substantive state law
claims." An important rationale behind Zapata was the Court's
ated goods would not know if he could safely import them into this country." Id at 433-34.
73 It is more likely that a: corporation would discontinue doing business in a state which
established a narrow forum non conveniens rule than that it would move overseas or shut
down completely. Thus, such a state would only put its own economy in jeopardy. Federal-
ism permits such a result.
7' US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
75 Such clauses enable parties to a contract to choose in advance a forum in which
potential disputes will be litigated or arbitrated.
" The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US 1, 15-19 (1972). Zapata was an admi-
ralty case, but courts have extended the holding in Zapata to non-admiralty contexts. See,
for example, AVC Nederland B.V. v Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F2d 148 (2d Cir
1984).
7 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F2d 341, 345 n 4 (8th
Cir 1985); Coastal Steel v Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F2d 190, 202 (3d Cir 1983); and
cases cited in Born and Westin, International Civil Litigation at 185-86 (cited in note 10).
But see General Engineering Corp. v Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F2d 352 (3d Cir
1986).
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conclusion that judicial enforcement of such clauses would en-
courage U.S. businesses to expand overseas and would facilitate
the flow of international trade.7 8 The Court noted that
[the elimination of] uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a
forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element
in international trade, commerce, and contracting .... [I]t
would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct
their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with
the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in
their calculations2
Irregular enforcement of such clauses would undoubtedly frustrate
the express intent of the parties. Furthermore, disrupting the sta-
bility of international transactions could offend foreign govern-
ments, which might perceive an economic interest of their own in
preserving the integrity of their firms' bargains.
No comparable interests compel application of a federal com-
mon law rule of forum non conveniens in international tort cases.
Such disputes involve neither clearly-expressed private expecta-
tions that divergent state rules might frustrate, nor federal inter-
ests. Congress has not legislated a federal liability standard for in-
ternational tort actions, and foreign governments apparently have
not sought to control such litigation by enacting laws that pre-
scribe jurisdiction.
C. Foreign Relations Implications of Forum Non Conveniens
Decisions
Some commentators argue that forum non conveniens deci-
sions, like decisions in act of state doctrine and forum selection
clause cases, implicate important foreign policy concerns. A U.S.
court's decision to hear a dispute that could also be tried abroad,
they argue, interferes with the foreign forum's interest in deciding
matters of local concern.8 0  As two commentators put it,
"[i]mposing American legal solutions. on other nations, however
beneficial when viewed from the perspective of individual litigants,
impedes the opportunity for other legal systems to craft local solu-
tions to their citizens' legal problems." 81
11 Zapata, 407 US at 8-9, 15.
79 Id at 13-14.
" See Greenberg, 4 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 182 (cited in note 11).
s Birnbaum and Dunham, 16 Brooklyn J Intl L at 261-62 (cited in note 2).
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This proposition has two flaws. First, where courts refuse to
dismiss international tort cases on forum non conveniens grounds,
they do not impose solutions on other nations. Rather, the courts
impose their forum's standards on U.S.-based corporations operat-
ing in or furnishing products to other nations. Such decisions di-
rectly affect only the corporate litigants. At most, these decisions
might hurt the U.S. forum in which a case was tried, for example,
if corporations leave a state where they receive an unfavorable
judgment.8 2 Second, a U.S. court's decision to hear a dispute in-
volving foreign plaintiffs need not impede the plaintiffs' govern-
ment from crafting local solutions. Foreign governments can de-
velop rules to regulate how multinational corporations operate
within their territory regardless of U.S. judicial decisions. More-
over, foreign governments are free to mandate that their own
courts resolve disputes concerning the conduct of multinational
corporations within their borders by enacting laws prescribing ju-
risdiction. Also, foreign governments could establish substantive
tort laws that create incentives for their private citizens to sue
U.S.-based corporations at home rather than in the U.S.
The idea that foreign governments generally care whether U.S.
courts hear cases involving their private citizens is largely specula-
tive. 4 The cases and commentary researched for this Comment re-
veal no instance of a foreign government protesting a judicial deci-
sion to provide private foreign plaintiffs access to U.S. courts for
purposes of suing U.S. corporations.
Potentially, a foreign government might be concerned with the
decision of a U.S. court in a private international dispute involving
its citizens where that government has implemented a pervasive
scheme regulating the industry involved in the dispute. Such regu-
lation might indicate a governmental interest in the controversy."
But divining such governmental interests, and then concluding
that where such interests are present American adjudication would
implicate foreign relations concerns, is a dubious venture.
In the Bhopal disaster litigation, for example, the district
court focused on the Indian government's extensive regulation of
its country's chemical industry as evidence indicating that the In-
" See Stangvik, 273 Cal Rptr at 190.
83 Parties would litigate the effect of such laws at the jurisdictional stage, as a "jurisdic-
tion to prescribe" case. Jurisdiction to prescribe concerns the jurisdiction of a legislature
over regulation of particular conduct.
8, See Zschernig, 389 US at 459-60 (Harlan concurring) (the argument that state court
evaluations of foreign laws and governmental policies have foreign relations consequences is
based entirely on speculation).
11 See Note, 69 Georgetown L J at 1278-80 (cited in note 14).
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dian government had a strong interest in the dispute, and there-
fore supporting a forum non conveniens dismissal.8 But the Indian
government itself initially sued in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York on behalf of all individual
victims, suggesting that that government was not opposed to the
U.S. judicial system crafting a solution to a problem that arose in
India.17 The Indian government preferred that the case not be dis-
missed for forum non conveniens. This scenario highlights the po-
tential difference between a foreign government's interests as con-
strued by a U.S. court and the foreign government's actual
preferences.
Some foreign governments, like the Indian government in the
Bhopal case, may prefer that U.S. forums resolve international tort
disputes. Given that foreign governments generally induce mul-
tinational corporations to do business in their countries, govern-
ments that appear prepared to waive their regulatory interests may
be trying to have their cake (foreign investment and imports) and
eat it too (relying on the U.S. to regulate corporate conduct).
Concededly, forum non conveniens decisions could affect the
international trade activities of U.S. corporations. Holding a U.S.-
based firm liable here for its tortious conduct abroad could in-
crease the U.S. firm's costs and handicap it vis-a-vis firms from
countries with tort laws and damage awards more favorable to cor-
porate defendants."" Such a result might irritate foreign govern-
ments that value foreign investment more highly than health and
safety concerns.
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear how much economic effect
even a forum non conveniens rule as radical as Texas's might have.
As Justice Doggett noted in Dow, due process and in personam
limitations on jurisdiction 9 still limit foreign plaintiffs' ability to
8" In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F Supp at 863-65.
47 The Indian government expressly urged the district court to allow Indian plaintiffs to
sue in the U.S., arguing that they could not receive adequate and speedy compensation in
India. See Birnbaum and Dunham, 16 Brooklyn J Intl L at 257 (cited in note 2), and In re
Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F Supp at 852, 867. For factual information regard-
ing the case, see Note, International Mass Tort Litigation: Forum Non Conveniens and the
Adequate Alternative Forum in Light of the Bhopal Disaster, 16 Ga J Intl & Comp L 109,
114-23 (1986). The district court ultimately dismissed the suit on forum non conveniens
grounds, and the parties later settled the dispute in India.
" See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 Ga L Rev 429, 436
(1986).
11 Courts do not consider forum non conveniens questions until after personal jurisdic-
tion and due process requirements have been satisfied.
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flock to Texas courts, despite the state's open forum policy.e° By
extension, these limitations also constrain the extent to which cor-
porations in Texas will be held liable for tortious conduct abroad.
Some commentators have argued that imposing U.S. regula-
tory standards on U.S.-based multinational corporations is within
the legitimate scope of this nation's foreign policy and therefore a
federal government concern.9' This argument is based on the no-
tion that the appearance of a double standard damages the United
States's image abroad. If other countries believe the United States
does not care if its corporations act abroad in a manner prohibited
at home, that perception could strain diplomatic relations and cre-
ate an unflattering reputation for U.S. exports."2 This foreign pol-
icy interest, so the argument goes, indicates that the federal gov-
ernment should decide whether U.S. courts will adjudicate
disputes regarding the overseas conduct of U.S. corporations, and
supports binding state courts to a federal common law of forum
non conveniens.
Even if the federal government does have an interest in deter-
mining the extent to which the foreign conduct of U.S. corpora-
tions should be regulated, however, it does not follow that a federal
common law of forum non conveniens best serves this interest.
Congress could serve such putative federal interests by using its
commerce power to legislate a federal standard of commercial tort
liability for U.S. corporate activities abroad. Such a statutory stan-
dard would preempt state rules.. Congress has not chosen to do so;
thus, the federal courts should not attempt to achieve similar re-
sults by mandating a federal common law forum non conveniens
rule.93
" Dow, 786 SW2d at 685 (Doggett concurring). As Doggett noted, "a defendant must
have sufficient contacts with Texas in each lawsuit such that the assertion of jurisdiction
comports with fair play and substantial justice." Id. The Texas Supreme Court had no juris-
dictional issue before it in Dow, but Doggett did note that both defendants had extensive
Texas contacts. Shell's world headquarters are located in Houston, and Dow conducts sub-
stantial operations from its Dow Chemical USA building in Houston. Also, Dow operates the
country's largest chemical manufacturing plant within sixty miles of Houston. Id at 681. See
also id at 686.
9 See Note, Exporting Hazardous Industries: Should American Standards Apply?, 20
NYU J Intl L & Pol 777, 782-83 (1988). For the argument that forum non conveniens dis-
missals remove the only consistent check on the actions of U.S. multinationals abroad, see
Note, An Economic Approach to Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Requested by U.S.
Multinational Corporations, 22 Geo Wash J Intl L & Econ 215 (1988).
92 Greenberg, 4 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 182 (cited in note 11).
" The congressional inaction argument does not apply with equal force in the act of
state doctrine and forum selection clause contexts, where clear, constitutionally-based fed-
eral interests are present.
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To the extent that forum non conveniens decisions may affect
international trade, the federal government's interest in those po-
tential effects is by no means exclusive. Many state governments
are increasingly involved in directly establishing trade and invest-
ment ties with foreign sovereign instrumentalities. 4 All fifty states
have international trade agencies and all but seven have at least
one trade office abroad.95 Growing state activity and competence in
building international economic ties undercuts the argument that
federal foreign commerce interests require federal control of forum
non conveniens.
In short, forum non conveniens decisions do not seriously im-
pair foreign regulatory activity, because foreign governments could
establish substantive laws that create incentives for their citizens
to sue in home courts, or could mandate that their own courts re-
solve tort disputes involving multinational corporations. The U.S.
Congress, moreover, has not expressed an interest in establishing
tort liability standards applicable to U.S. commercial activities
abroad. Unlike act of state doctrine and forum selection clause
cases, forum non conveniens decisions do not implicate constitu-
tionally-based federal foreign relations and commerce interests
strong enough to override competing state interests.
IV. APPLICATION OF STATE FORUM NON CONVENIENS LAW IN
DIVERSITY ACTIONS
The conclusion that states should apply their own forum non
conveniens rules in international cases necessarily leads to the
question whether federal courts should apply federal or state fo-
rum non conveniens law in diversity suits. Federal diversity courts
should apply state forum non conveniens law, this Comment ar-
gues, because forum non conveniens is substantive in nature and
employs an inquiry closely aligned with choice of law analysis. If
federal forum non conveniens law were to apply in diversity ac-
tions, then many domestic defendants in international tort actions
filed in state courts could circumvent state forum non conveniens
rules by having their cases removed to federal court.96 Because di-
I4 Total state spending on international trade promotion stood at $91.9 million in fiscal
year 1990, up 58% from fiscal year 1988. National Association of State Development Agen-
cies, State Export Program Database 744-45 (NASDA, 1990).
" Id.
"0 28 USC § 1441 (1988) provides that a defendant may remove from state to federal
court any civil action of which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction, as long
as no defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action was brought. Under 28 USC §
1332(c)(1) (1988), a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it has been incorporated
and the state in which the corporation has its principal place of business.
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versity of citizenship often exists in international cases, such ma-
neuvers could successfully undermine state forum non conveniens
rules that diverge from the federal standard. In Piper, the Su-
preme Court explicitly left unresolved the question whether, under
Erie, state or federal forum non conveniens law applies in a diver-
sity case.9 7 Thus, the Court did not decide whether forum non con-
veniens is a substantive rule of law or a procedural rule only.9 8
Many lower federal courts, however, have concluded that federal
forum non conveniens law applies in a diversity action. 9
As an empirical matter, forum non conveniens decisions invar-
iably determine the outcomes of international tort cases and thus
have the effect of substantive law. As Justice Doggett noted in
Dow, "a forum non conveniens dismissal is often outcome-determi-
native, effectively defeating the claim and denying the plaintiff re-
covery."' 00 Because of severe monetary limitations on recovery in
foreign forums, the absence of contingent fee arrangements, and
the presence of restrictive discovery rules and products liability
laws, dismissals in favor of foreign forums often constitute victory
for the defendants. 10' Few cases dismissed in the U.S. on forum
non conveniens grounds ever reach trial abroad. 02 Although courts
and commentators routinely discuss forum non conveniens as if
the issue at stake were a choice between two competing jurisdic-
tions, in fact, the usual choice is between litigating in the United
States or not at all.
This section illuminates the substantive nature of forum non
conveniens decisions in international cases in two ways. First, it
Piper, 454 US at 248 n 13.
9 Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply substantive
state law, but federal procedural law. Erie, 304 US at 78.
99 See, for example, Sibaja, 757 F2d at 1219; In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orle-
ans, 821 F2d at 1159; Royal Bed and Spring Co., Inc. v Famossul Industria E Comercio De
Moveis Ltda., 906 F2d 45, 50 (1st Cir 1990) (citing Sibaja); and Lapides v Doner, 248 F
Supp 883, 888-92 (E D Mich 1965). See also cases cited in Born and Westin, International
Civil Litigation at 226 (cited in note 10); Greenberg, 4 Intl Tax & Bus Law at 180 n 220
(cited in note 11). But see Mizokami Bros. of Arizona Inc. v Mobay Chemical Corp., 483 F
Supp 201, 203 n 1 (W D Mo 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, vacated in part and
remanded, 660 F2d 712 (8th Cir 1981) (federal diversity court required to apply Missouri
forum non conveniens law, but Missouri doctrine is same as the federal rule).
100 Dow, 786 SW2d at 682 (Doggett concurring).
101 See note 3 and accompanying text.
102 David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather
Fantastic Fiction", 103 L Q Rev 398, 409, 418-20 (1987); see also Irish Nati Ins. Co. v Aer
Lingus Teoranta, 739 F2d 90, 91 (2d Cir 1984) (court said the claim would never be pursued
in the alternate forum because of that forum's severe damage award limitations; to weigh
convenience in this context would amount to a "legal charade").
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distinguishes forum non conveniens decisions from the operation
of 28 USC § 1404(a), a procedural rule permitting transfer of
venue, which replaced the common law of forum non conveniens
for domestic litigation in federal courts. Second, this section argues
that forum non conveniens determinations and choice of law deter-
minations, which are unquestionably substantive, are closely
analogous.
A. Contrast Between Forum Non Conveniens and Section 1404(a)
Forum non conveniens doctrine and § 1404(a) have the same
historical roots, but unlike § 1404(a) transfers, forum non con-
veniens decisions have outcome-determinative effects upon litiga-
tion. Under the rule of Van Dusen v Barrack,03 when a federal
court transfers a case to another federal venue under § 1404(a), the
transferee court must apply the substantive state law (including
choice of law rules) that the transferor court would have applied.104
Thus, a change of venue does not affect the law applied to the case
and is therefore only a procedural maneuver that will not alter a
dispute's outcome.
A dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds in an interna-
tional case, on the other hand, will most likely significantly affect
the outcome of a suit. First, the dismissed case may never be tried
at all. An important distinction between § 1404(a) and forum non
conveniens is that the former only allows a court to transfer a case
to another domestic forum, whereas forum non conveniens enables
a court to dismiss a suit altogether. 05 As a practical matter, forum
non conveniens dismissals are outcome-determinative because for-
eign courts, unlike domestic courts receiving § 1404(a) transfers,
rarely adjudicate suits dismissed from U.S. courts.106 As one fed-
eral court acknowledged, "only an outright dismissal with
prejudice could be more 'outcome determinative' than a condi-
tional dismissal to a distant forum in a foreign land.' 0 7
Second, a forum non conveniens dismissal can change the ap-
plicable law. Even if the foreign forum eventually tries the dis-
missed suit, that forum will apply its own choice of law rules, po-
103 376 US 612 (1964).
104 Id at 639, 643-44.
100 Many federal courts, though, use their discretion to attach conditions to forum non
conveniens dismissals in international cases, sometimes providing that a suit may be refiled
in the U.S. court if the foreign forum will not entertain the suit.
100 Robertson, 103 L Q Rev at 409, 419-20 (cited in note 102).
107 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F2d at 1156.
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tentially leading to application of a different law and therefore a
different outcome than if a U.S. court had tried the case. In both
of these ways, therefore, a forum non conveniens dismissal in favor
of a foreign forum is not merely a "change of courtrooms."' 08
Because a forum non conveniens dismissal affects the suit's
substantive outcome, allowing a federal diversity court to dismiss a
case that a state court applying state forum non conveniens law
would retain (or vice-versa) violates the Erie doctrine. In Van Du-
sen, the Court prohibited circumvention of substantive state rules
via transfer; accordingly, federal courts should not be able to ig-
nore substantive state forum non conveniens law by applying fed-
eral forum non conveniens law. 0 9 As a consequence, a federal court
deciding a diversity action in Texas after Dow, for example, would
not have the option of entertaining forum non conveniens motions
in international wrongful death or personal injury suits.
B. Relationship Between Choice of Law and Forum Non
Conveniens
The important role that choice of law considerations play in
the forum non conveniens inquiry, as well as the close relationship
between choice of law and forum non conveniens analyses, suggest
that forum non conveniens decisions, like choice of law decisions,
turn on substantive considerations. Gilbert identified choice of law
considerations as one of the public interest factors that courts
should weigh in the forum non conveniens analysis." 0 Later courts
have taken this suggestion to heart and have emphasized choice of
law considerations in their forum non conveniens decisions, dis-
missing cases in which those courts have found that foreign law
should apply."'
108 Van Dusen, 376 US at 639. Additional evidence that forum non conveniens law is
substantive may be that denial of a forum non conveniens motion is not a collateral order
subject to immediate appeal as a final judgment under 28 USC § 1291. Van Cauwenberghe v
Biard, 486 US 517 (1988). The Court stated in Van Cauwenberghe that consideration of the
Gilbert factors when weighing whether a particular forum is so inconvenient to a defendant
as to warrant dismissal entangles courts in the merits of the underlying dispute. Id at 528.
See also Coastal Steel v Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F2d 190, 195 (3d Cir 1983) (the
Gilbert factors "are considerations going to the merits of the case and requiring assessment
of the substantive issues in the litigation").
109 See Stein, 133 U Pa L Rev at 821 (cited in note 14).
110 Gilbert, 330 US at 509.
111 See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F Supp at 866
(need to apply foreign law is a significant consideration in a forum non conveniens motion);
De Melo, 801 F2d at 1064 (probability that Brazilian law would govern the litigation
strongly supported forum non conveniens dismissal); Chambers' v Merrell-Dow
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In addition, the public interest balancing that forum non con-
veniens analysis requires closely resembles the governmental inter-
est balancing that choice of law rules typically require." 2 When
assessing the Gilbert "public interest factors," courts must deter-
mine the substantive concerns of the alternative forums with re-
spect to the controversy. 3 Yet the flexible forum non conveniens
doctrine affords judges more discretion than choice of law analysis.
Federal appellate courts review forum non conveniens decisions
under a weak abuse of discretion standard, while choice of law de-
terminations are fully reviewable. This may help to explain why, as
some commentators have noted, forum non conveniens decisions
are often choice of law decisions in disguise.114 As one commenta-
tor has stated, the forum non conveniens issue in international
products liability cases turns less on administrative convenience
than on the propriety of imposing U.S. standards of liability on
particular foreign transactions." 5
In Klaxon Co. v Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court
declared that, under Erie, state choice of law rules must apply in
federal diversity suits in order to promote decisional uniformity
among state and federal courts within a state and thereby avoid
forum shopping.1 6 The Court stated that any divergence among
federal courts in different states is attributable to the federal sys-
tem, which permits states to pursue policies that differ from their
neighbors'. 1 7 Federal courts, the Klaxon court added, should not
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 35 Ohio St 3d 123, 519 NE2d 370, 379 (1988); Barrantes Cabalceta v
Standard Fruit Co., 667 F Supp 833, 838-39 (S D Fla 1987); Dahl v United Technologies
Corp., 632 F2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir 1980); Calavo Growers of Cal. v Belgium, 632 F2d 963,
967 (2d Cir 1980); Schertenleib v Traum, 589 F2d 1156, 1165 (2d Cir 1978);
Farmanfarmaian v Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F2d 880, 881 (2d Cir 1978). Regarding the close
relationship between forum non conveniens and choice of law, see'Stein, 133 U Pa L Rev at
818-22 (cited in note 14); Weintraub, 16 Brooklyn J Intl L at 233-34 (cited in note 3).
"' See Born and Westin, International Civil Litigation at 225-26 (cited in note 10);
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971) (choice of law principles). When a state
such as Texas rejects forum non conveniens altogether, it is the state legislature's rejection
that may be analogous to choice of law decisionmaking.
113 See Stein, 133 U Pa L Rev at 784-85, 821-22 (cited in note 14); Comment, 74 Cal L
Rev at 591-94 (cited in note 14); Paul K. Speck, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law
in Admiralty: Time for an Overhaul, 18 J Merit L & Comm 185, 207-08 (1987) (forum non
conveniens analysis and choice of law analysis overlap so significantly that courts often treat
them as virtually identical).
11, See Stein, 133 U Pa L Rev at 822 (cited in note 14); see generally Speck, 18 J Marit
L & Comm at 207-08 (cited in note 113).
' Comment, 74 Cal L Rev at 598 (cited in note 14).
16 Klaxon Co. v Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 US 487, 496 (1941). See Wright, Law of
Federal Courts at 364-70 (cited in note 64).
117 Klaxon, 313 US at 496.
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thwart local policies by enforcing an independent general law of
conflict of laws.'18
These same arguments apply in the forum non conveniens
context. Federal courts (and defendants, via removal to federal
courts) should not thwart substantive state policies regarding the
extent to which firms will be held liable for conduct abroad. Hence,
the principle behind the Klaxon rule militates in favor of applying
state forum non conveniens law in federal diversity actions.
Thus, because forum non conveniens determinations often
turn on a choice of law decision, and because of the close identity
between choice of law and forum non conveniens analysis, federal
courts should apply state forum non conveniens law in diversity
actions.
CONCLUSION
Courts use the forum non conveniens doctrine as a tool for
controlling foreign plaintiff access to forums in the United States.
States have strong interests in deciding when to adjudicate actions
involving corporations incorporated and doing business under state
law. Thus, states must be able to apply their own forum non con-
veniens rules in their courts, or to reject the doctrine altogether.
The opposing argument for a federal common law rule of forum
non conveniens fails for lack of significant foreign relations impli-
cations. Furthermore, because forum non conveniens law has a
substantive impact upon international litigation, federal diversity
courts should, under Erie, apply state forum non conveniens rules.
As a policy matter, it is unclear whether strict or liberal forum non
conveniens laws best advance U.S. foreign economic interests. The
best solution, therefore, is for the states to serve as "laboratories of
federalism" in which their courts and legislatures may experiment
with a range of options." 9
118 Id.
119 See Connecticut Light and Power Co. v Federal Power Comm'n, 324 US 515, 530
(1945).
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